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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS IN
COLLATERALIZED CREDIT MARKETS
THIAGO REVIL T. FERREIRA AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We analyze the possibility of the simultaneous presence of three key features in price-
taking credit markets: infinity horizon, collateralized credit operations and effective additional
enforcement mechanisms, i.e. those implying payments besides the value of the collateral guaran-
tees.
We show that these additional mechanisms, instead of strengthening, actually weaken the re-
strictions that collateral places on borrowing. In fact, when collateral requirements are not large
enough in relation to the effectiveness of the additional mechanisms, lenders anticipate total pay-
ments exceeding the value of the collateral requirements. Thus, by non-arbitrage, they lend more
than the value of these guarantees. In turn, in the absence of other market frictions such as
borrowing constraints, agents may indefinitely postpone their debts, implying the collapse of the
agent’s maximization problem and of such credit markets.
Keywords. Effective default enforcements, Collateral guarantees, Individual’s optimality.
JEL classification: D50; D52.
1. Introduction
In modern financial markets, collateral guarantees play an important role in enforcing borrowers
not to entirely default on their financial promises. These guarantees are used in several credit
operations, from corporate bonds to Collateralized Mortgages Obligations,1 allowing markets to
reduce credit risk and increase portfolio diversification. However, to protect investors from the
excess of losses induced by large negative shocks in the value of collateral guarantees, financial
markets may create and implement additional enforcement mechanisms against default. In this
paper, we focus on the theoretical effects of such a policy on the agent’s maximization problem and,
consequently, on the price-taking credit market.
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1That is, derivative assets secured by pools of individual mortgages, each of which is backed mostly by real estates.
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In the infinite horizon context, the incentives provided by the collateralization of financial con-
tracts are mostly addressed when the only enforcement mechanism against default is the seizure
of the associated physical collateral guarantees. In fact, for incomplete market economies, Araujo,
Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002) prove the existence of equilibrium independent of the choice of
collateral guarantees. One important consequence is that such simple financial structure keeps the
credit market from collapsing. Essentially, since agents default only when the value of the collateral
requirements is smaller than that of the respective financial promise, the net payoff of lending is
always less than or equal to the one associated to holding the amount of the required collateral.
Therefore, by the absence of arbitrage, the value of any loan has to be less than the value of the
respective collateral, precluding agents to become leveraged and eliminating Ponzi schemes.
However, Pa´scoa and Seghir (2007) have shown that the results above may not hold when linear
utility penalties for default act as an additional enforcement mechanism besides the seizure of
collateral guarantees. They provide examples of deterministic economies where sufficiently harsh
penalties induce agents to pay more than the depreciated collateral, which, by non-arbitrage, may
lead the value of collateral requirements to be persistently lower than that of the loan. In such
a context, given any budget feasible plan, agents may improve their utilities by taking new loans,
constituting the associated collateral guarantees and increasing their consumption. Therefore, there
is no individual’s optimal plan and we cannot define a credit market.
In this paper, we analyze how the interaction between the infinite horizon, collateral guarantees
and generic additional enforcement mechanisms can extend the result from Pa´scoa and Seghir’s
particular examples to more general economies. Doing so, we identify the effectiveness of these
additional mechanisms as an important economic concept responsible for the result. Additionally,
we argue that two new features of our approach enable us to reach further conclusions than the
ones already presented in the literature. First, instead of using an general equilibrium framework,
we only analyze the decision problem of one agent. Second, we work with a reduced form approach
to model the inclusion of additional enforcement mechanisms against default.
Focusing on the maximization problem of a price taker agent in an economy analogous to that
studied by Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002), we introduce effective additional enforcement
mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms enforcing payments besides the value of the collateral guarantees. We
represent these additional mechanisms by their effectiveness on enforcing payments besides the value
of the collateral requirements. Thus, we do not intend to explicitly model how the market imposes
additional payments on borrowers besides the value of collateral guarantees. However, with this
reduced form approach, we can concentrate on the pricing and market effects of these additional
mechanisms. In fact, we derive an explicit relationship between the primitives of the economy, such
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as the effectiveness and collateral requirements, implying the collapse of the agent’s maximization
problem.
Essentially, we only need one agent to reach conclusions about asset pricing in competitive credit
markets. Additionally, with the reduced form approach for the additional mechanisms against
default such pricing becomes well tractable. Then, as we include enforcement mechanisms in addition
to the seizure of collateral requirements, lenders may expect sufficiently large payments for their
loans besides the value of the these requirements. In such situation, these additional mechanisms,
instead of strengthening, actually weaken the restrictions that collateral places on borrowing. In
fact, lenders anticipate that, even in case of default, they still receive more than just the value of the
collateral guarantees. Thus, by non-arbitrage, they lend more than the value of these guarantees.
On the other end, borrowers have the incentive and the possibility to take new credits in order to
pay their older ones, since there is no debt constraints or monitoring precluding agents to incur in
a Ponzi scheme. Their behavior, then, leads to the non-existence of a physical feasible solution for
the agent’s problem and to the collapse of the credit market.
Regarding the relationship found between the primitives of the economy, we may view it from two
different perspectives. From the first one, given a level of effectiveness of the additional mechanisms,
we show that there are strictly positive upper bounds for collateral requirements under which agents
have incentives to indefinitely postpone their debts through new credits, leading to the non-existence
of an optimal utility maximizing plan. Therefore, the market choice of collateral guarantees becomes
relevant. From the second one, we provide theoretical foundations to the examples given by Pa´scoa
and Seghir (2007). That is, given collateral requirements, we show that any sufficiently effective
additional enforcement mechanism implies the non-existence of physical feasible individuals’ optimal
plans. Hence, it is the effectiveness of these mechanisms that brings the main result, not any
mechanism per se.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an infinite horizon economy
with assets subject to default and with effective enforcement mechanisms in addition to collateral
repossession. In Section 3 we show our main result. Some extensions are discussed in Sections 4.
2. Model
Consider a discrete-time infinite-horizon economy with uncertainty and symmetric information.
Let S be the set of states of nature and Ft the information available at period t ∈ T := N ∪ {0}.
Ft is a partition of S, and if t′ > t, make Ft′ finer than Ft. Summarizing the uncertainty structure,
define an event-tree as D = {(t, σ) ∈ T × 2S : t ∈ T, σ ∈ Ft}, where a pair ξ := (t, σ) ∈ D is called a
node and t(ξ) := t is the associated period of time. For simplicity, at t = 0 there is no information,
that is F0 := {S} and, therefore, there is only one node, which is denoted by ξ0.
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A node ξ′ = (t′, ψ′) is a successor of ξ = (t, ψ), denoted by ξ′ ≥ ξ, if t′ ≥ t and ψ′ ⊆ ψ. Given
ξ ∈ D, the set of its successors is given by the subtree D(ξ) := {µ ∈ D : µ ≥ ξ}. Also, for each
ξ 6= ξ0, since Ft(ξ) is finer than Ft(ξ)−1, there is only one predecessor ξ− ∈ D. We define ξ′ as an
immediate successor of ξ when it is in the set ξ+ := {ξ′ ∈ D : ξ′ ≥ ξ, t(ξ′) = t(ξ) + 1}.
At each node ξ in the event-tree D there is a non-empty and finite set of commodities, L. These
commodities may be traded in a competitive market at unitary prices pξ = (p(ξ,l))l∈L ∈ RL+ by
a non-empty set of consumers. Also, at any node ξ > ξ0, there is a technology represented by a
matrix with non-negative entries, Yξ := ((Yξ)l,l′ ; (l, l′) ∈ L×L), which transform commodity bundles
consumed at ξ−, and allows for durable commodities. Thus, for each (l, l′) ∈ L × L, (Yξ)l,l′ is the
amount of commodity l obtained at ξ if one unit of commodity l′ is consumed at ξ−. Also, let
Wξ ∈ RL+ be the aggregate physical resources up to node ξ, while W = (Wξ)ξ∈D is the plan of such
resources.
There is a finite set of real assets J(ξ) at each node ξ ∈ D. Each j in J(ξ) is short-lived, has
promises A(µ,j) ∈ RL++ ∪ {0} at µ ∈ ξ+, and is traded in competitive markets by a unitary price
q(ξ,j) ∈ R+. Note that, when financial promises are non-trivial, its market value take into account
all the commodities prices. This assumption may be intuitively understood as an indexation for
asset payments using as a price index a referential bundle that may vary with the uncertainty of the
economy. Thus, independently of prices, when at least a percentage of original promises is honored
by borrowers, lenders maintain a minimal purchase power for every commodity.
Since assets are subject to credit risk, borrowers are burdened to constitute physical collateral
guarantees in order to limit lenders’ losses. Particularly, for every unit of an asset j ∈ J(ξ) sold,
borrowers must establish—and may consume—a bundle C(ξ,j) ∈ RL+ \ {0} that is seized by the
market in case of default. For the sake of notation, let J(D) := {(ξ, j) ∈ D×∪µ∈DJ(µ) : j ∈ J(ξ)}
and J+(D) := {(µ, j) ∈ D × ∪η∈DJ(η) : (µ−, j) ∈ J(D)}.
Furthermore, additional default enforcement mechanisms may exist. For each unit of asset j ∈
J(ξ) sold, we let financial markets recover amounts of payments (F(µ,j)(pµ))µ∈ξ+ that may be higher
than the value of depreciated collateral guarantees in case of default. We allow generality in the
type of additional enforcement mechanisms assuming that borrowers pay, and lenders expect to
receive, a fixed percentage of the remaining debt, λ(µ,j) ∈ [0, 1]. More formally, for every unit of
asset j ∈ J(ξ), each borrower pays at each µ ∈ ξ+ an amount
F(µ,j)(pµ) := min{pµA(µ,j), pµYµC(ξ,j)}+ λ(µ,j) [pµA(µ,j) − pµYµC(ξ,j)]+,
where λ(µ,j) ∈ [0, 1] is the effectiveness of additional enforcement mechanisms on asset j at node µ,
and, for any z ∈ R, [z]+ := max{z, 0}.
Our approach allows us to include in our analysis economic (i.e. those induced by legal contracts)
and non-economic (e.g. moral sanctions, loss of reputations) default enforcement mechanisms,
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provided that these mechanisms may be summarized by a family of parameters of effectiveness,
(λ(µ,j))(µ,j)∈J+(D). However, this last requirement do not induce loss of generality, since traders
perfect foresee asset payments. In fact, we can always normalize financial payments as done above.
Also, with this approach, it is possible to focus on the consequences of the effectiveness of such
mechanisms on the individual’s decision.
Definition. Given (µ, j) ∈ J+(D), additional enforcement mechanisms are effective on asset
j at a node µ when λ(µ,j)A(µ,j) is a non-zero vector. Additional enforcement mechanisms are
persistently effective in a subtree D(ξ), if for any µ > ξ, there is j ∈ J(µ−) on which additional
enforcement mechanisms are effective at µ.
Definitions above not only depend on parameters (λ(µ,j))(µ,j)∈J+(D), but also on the non-triviality
of the original promises. Thus, effective additional enforcement mechanisms means that, in the case
of default, a strictly positive amount of resources is seized besides the depreciated collateral value.
In contrast to any equilibrium model, we focus in the non-existence of a physically feasible solution
for the individual’s problem. For these reason, it is sufficient to study a decision model where there
is an infinitely lived agent, namely i, who perfectly foresees both market prices and the effectiveness
of additional enforcement mechanisms.
Agent i has physical endowments (wiξ)ξ∈D ∈ RD×L+ and preferences represented by a utility
function U i : RD×L+ → R+ ∪ {+∞}. As commodities may be durable, we denote by W iξ the
cumulated endowments of agent i up to node ξ, which are recursively defined by: W iξ = w
i
ξ+YξW
i
ξ− ,
when ξ > ξ0, and W iξ0 = w
i
ξ0
, otherwise. Also, we assume that, for any ξ ∈ D, W iξ ≤Wξ.
Let xξ ∈ RL+ be a bundle of autonomous consumption at node ξ (i.e. non-collateralized com-
modities). Also, define θ(ξ,j) and ϕ(ξ,j) as the quantities of asset j ∈ J(ξ) purchased and sold at the
same node. Given (p, q) ∈ Π := RD×L+ × RJ(D)+ , a plan
(x, θ, ϕ) :=
(
(xξ, θ(ξ,j), ϕ(ξ,j)); ξ ∈ D, j ∈ J(ξ)
) ∈ E := RD×L+ × RJ(D)+ × RJ(D)+
is budget feasible for agent i at prices (p, q) when
pξ0(xξ0 − wiξ0) + pξ0
∑
j∈J(ξ0)
C(ξ0,j)ϕ(ξ0,j) +
∑
j∈J(ξ0)
q(ξ0,j)(θ(ξ0,j) − ϕ(ξ0,j)) ≤ 0,(1)
pξ(xξ − wiξ) + pξ
∑
j∈J(ξ)
C(ξ,j)ϕ(ξ,j) +
∑
j∈J(ξ)
q(ξ,j)(θ(ξ,j) − ϕ(ξ,j))(2)
≤ pξYξxξ− +
∑
j∈J(ξ−)
(
pξYξC(ξ−,j)ϕ(ξ−,j) + F(ξ,j)(pξ)(θ(ξ−,j) − ϕ(ξ−,j))
)
, ∀ξ > ξ0.
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Also, (x, θ, ϕ) ∈ E is physically feasible if xξ +
∑
j∈J(ξ) C(ξ,j)ϕ(ξ,j) ≤Wξ, for any ξ ∈ D. Finally,
given (p, q) ∈ Π, the objective of agent i is to maximize the utility of his consumption, U i((xiξ +∑
j∈J(ξ) C(ξ,j)ϕ
i
(ξ,j))ξ∈D), choosing a budget feasible plan (x
i, θi, ϕi) ∈ E.
3. Enforcement mechanisms and the size of collateral bundles
In this section, we prove our main result: in contrast to the polar case studied by Araujo, Pa´scoa
and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002), the market choice of collateral bundles becomes relevant when there are
persistently effective additional enforcement mechanisms besides collateral repossession. To achieve
our objective, we impose the following hypotheses.
Assumption A1. For any ξ ∈ D, W iξ  0.
Assumption A2. Given z = (zξ) ∈ RL×D+ , define U i(z) =
∑
ξ∈D u
i
ξ(zξ), where for any ξ ∈ D, the
function uiξ : RL+ → R+ is concave, continuous and strictly increasing. Also, U i(W ) is finite.
Given η ∈ D, let Ω(η) be the set of assets j ∈ J(η) on which additional enforcement mechanisms
are effective at some node µ ∈ η+. Note that, given a subtree D(ξ) in which additional enforcement
mechanisms are persistently effective, Ω(η) 6= ∅, ∀ η ∈ D(ξ).
Theorem. Under Assumptions A1-A2, suppose that additional enforcement mechanisms are per-
sistently effective in a subtree D(ξ). Independently of the prices (p, q) ∈ Π, there are strictly positive
upper bounds (Ψη)η∈D(ξ) such that, if collateral bundles satisfy
min
j∈Ω(η)
‖C(η,j)‖Σ < Ψη, ∀ η ∈ D(ξ),
then agent i’s problem does not have a physically feasible solution.
Proof. To shorten the notation, given z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ Rm+ , let ‖z‖Σ :=
∑m
s=1 zs and ‖z‖max :=
max1≤s≤m zs. Fix σ > 1. Given η ≥ ξ, define the number
piη :=
U i(W )
minl∈LW i(η,l)
, and piη :=
uiη(σWη)− uiη(Wη)
σ‖Wη‖max .
Thus, for each η ∈ D(ξ),
Υη := min
j∈Ω(η)
∑
µ∈η+
λ(µ,j)piµ min
l∈L
A(µ,j,l)
is strictly positive, where A(µ,j,l) denotes the l-th coordinate of A(µ,j).
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Suppose that, at each η ∈ D(ξ),
min
j∈Ω(η)
‖C(η,j)‖Σ < Ψη := Υη
piη
.
Assume that, for some (p, q) ∈ Π, there is an optimal budget and physically-feasible solu-
tion (xi, θi, ϕi) ∈ E for agent i’s problem. It follows from Lemma 1 (see Appendix) that there
are, for every η ∈ D, multipliers γiη ∈ R++ and non-pecuniary returns (super-gradients) viη ∈
∂uiη
(
xiη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ
i
(η,j)
)
such that,2 for each j ∈ J(η),
γiηpη ≥ viη +
∑
µ∈η+
γiµpµYµ,(3)
γiηq(η,j) ≥
∑
µ∈η+
γiµF(µ,j)(pµ).(4)
Also, the family of multipliers (γiη)η∈D can always be constructed to satisfy (see Lemma 1)
(5) γiηpηW
i
η ≤
∑
η∈D
uiη
xiη + ∑
j∈J(η)
C(η,j)ϕ
i
(η,j)
 ≤∑
η∈D
uiη(Wη),
where the last inequality follows from Assumption A2 jointly with the physical feasibility of agent
i’s consumption. Moreover, it is possible to find lower and upper bounds for γiηpη at each η ∈
D. Assumption A1 and equation (5) ensure that γiη‖pη‖Σ ≤ piη. Given η ∈ D, let ciη = xiη +∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ
i
η be the consumption bundle chosen by agent i at η. Using equation (3), we have
that
γiηpη(σWη − ciη) ≥ viη(σWη − ciη) ≥ uiη(σWη)− uiη(ciη) ≥ uiη(σWη)− uiη(Wη) > 0.
Therefore, γiη‖pη‖Σ ≥ piη. Since Ω(η) 6= ∅ and minj∈Ω(η) ‖C(η,j)‖Σ < Ψη, at every node η ∈ D(ξ)
there exists j ∈ Ω(η) such that
γiη(pηC(η,j) − q(η,j)) ≤ γiηpηC(η,j) −
∑
µ∈η+
γiµF(µ,j)(pµ) < 0,(6)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of the upper bound of collateral requirements.
Finally, using the Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we conclude that agent i’s problem does not have a
solution, contradicting the optimality of (xi, θi, ϕi) ∈ E under prices (p, q) ∈ Π. 
Note that, by construction, upper bounds on collateral requirements, (Ψη)η∈D(ξ), depend only
on the primitives of the economy and, for computational objectives, can be easily found.
2Given a concave function f : X ⊂ Rn → R ∪ {−∞} and x ∈ X, the super-differential of f , ∂f(x), is defined as
the set of points p ∈ X, called super-gradients, such that f(y)− f(x) ≤ p(y − x), ∀y ∈ X.
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Additionally, given collateral requirements, we can find lower bounds for the effectiveness on
D(ξ), (λµ)µ>ξ, such that, if (λ(µ,j))µ>ξ,j∈Ω(µ−) satisfy
min
j∈Ω(µ−)
λ(µ,j) > λµ, ∀µ > ξ,
then, independently of prices, and for any enforcement mechanism inducing such effectiveness, there
is no physical feasible solution for the agents’ problem.3 These lower bounds are informative, i.e.
λµ ∈ (0, 1), only for collateral requirements that are not high enough. In fact, for larger collateral
requirements there is no default and, therefore, the market price of collateral requirements is always
greater that the loan value.
4. On endogenous effectiveness
A key feature of our model is that we assume the amount of payments besides the collateral
guarantees is independent of the borrowers and does not depend on the history of default. This
assumption allowed us to identify sold with purchased assets. Implicitly, we pool the debt contracts
into derivatives following a trivial securitization, that is, by identifying prices and payments of debt
markets with those of investment markets. However, our analysis may be extended for equilib-
rium models in which the effectiveness of payment enforcement mechanisms is an endogenous and
personalized variable.
For instance, we may suppose that the access to credit markets depend on previous payments.
That is, consider a dynamic infinite horizon general equilibrium model in which, at any state of
nature, and for every agent, the access to credit securities depend on the history of default. Thus, in
this new framework, for default penalties sufficiently restrictive on the access of credit markets, there
may be endogenous incentives inducing borrowers to deliver payments larger than the depreciated
value of collateral requirements. Also, suppose that financial markets still preserve some features
from our original model. That is, each type of credit contract is securitized into only one derivative,
primitive and derivative prices are equal, and lenders perfectly foresee the payments of derivatives.
Specifically for this last feature, suppose that, in case of default, agents advance any payment in
addition to the depreciated collateral as a percentage of the remaining debt, facing payment functions
with an analogous specification of our (F(µ,j))(µ,j)∈J+(D).
In this new context, under hypotheses on individual’ characteristics analogous to Assumptions
A1-A2, there are two conditions under which our Theorem still holds:
3Using the same arguments in the proof of the Theorem, it is sufficient to take
λµ :=
piµ− minj∈Ω(µ−) ‖C(µ−,j)‖Σ
minj∈Ω(µ−)
∑
η∈µ piη minl∈L A(η, j, l)
, ∀µ > ξ.
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(i) For any plan of prices, individual optimal allocations satisfy inequalities analogous to (3)-(5);
(ii) At the moment of the credit operation, borrowers are only required to constitute the asso-
ciated collateral requirements.
In fact, assume that additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently effective in a sub-event
tree. If there is a physical feasible optimal allocation, using the same arguments of the proof of our
theorem, condition (i) implies that if collateral requirements are not high enough, then unitary loan
prices persistently exceed the associated collateral value. Thus, by condition (ii), the agent may
improve his respective utility increasing borrowing along the event-tree. A contradiction.
Therefore, a natural question arises. When does an economy satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)?
Regarding condition (i), it follows from Lemma 2 that any convex model satisfies it.4 However,
some enforcement mechanisms may induce non-convex budget sets. Even in these cases, condition
(i) still holds if these non-convexities involve only the borrowers’ deliveries.5 On the other hand,
condition (ii) holds unless there is some restriction on the short sales in addition to collateral
requirements.
Appendix
Lemma 1. Let (p, q) ∈ Π and fix a budget and physically feasible plan zi := (xi, θi, ϕi) ∈ E. Under
Assumptions A1 and A2, if zi is an optimal allocation for agent i’s problem at prices (p, q), then
for every η ∈ D, the function uiη is super-differentiable at the point ciη := xiη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ
i
(η,j),
there are multipliers γiη ∈ R++ and super-gradients viη ∈ ∂uiη
(
ciη
)
such that, for each j ∈ J(η),
γiηpη ≥ viη +
∑
µ∈η+
γiµpµYµ,(7)
γiηq(η,j) ≥
∑
µ∈η+
γiµF(µ,j)(pµ).(8)
Also, the plan of multipliers (γiη)η∈D satisfy
(9) γiηpηW
i
η ≤
∑
η∈D
uiη(c
i
η).
Proof. Given T ∈ N, define DT = {η ∈ D : t(η) = T} and DT = {η ∈ D : η ∈
⋃T
k=0Dk}. For any
η ∈ D, let Z(η) = RL+ × RJ(η)+ × RJ(η)+ . For convenience of notations, let zξ−0 := 0 ∈ Z(ξ
−
0 ), where
4We mean that a model is convex when agents’ objective functions are concave and, for each vector of prices,
budget sets are convex.
5Technically, in this case, the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1 can be remade by redefining the truncated
problem (P i,T ) in such form that, for any η ∈ DT , variables ϕη are fixed and equal to the optimal choices ϕiη .
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Z(ξ−0 ) := RL+. Consider the optimization problem:
(P i,T )
max
∑
η∈DT
uiη
(
xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j)
)
s.t.

zη := (xη, θη, ϕη) ∈ Z(η) ∀ η ∈ DT ,
giη(zη, zη− ; p, q) ≤ 0, ∀ η ∈ DT ,
xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη, ∀ η ∈ DT ,
zη ∈ [0, ziη], ∀ η ∈ DT .
where the inequality giη(zη, zη− ; p, q) ≤ 0 represents the budget constraint at node η, that is, in-
equality (1) or (2), and given (x, y) ∈ Rm × Rm, the interval [x, y] := {z ∈ Rm : ∃a ∈ [0, 1], z =
ax+ (1− a)y}. It follows from the existence of an optimal individual plan at prices (p, q) that there
exists a solution for (P i,T ), namely (zi,Tη )η∈DT .
6
Given η ∈ D, define the concave function νiη : RL × RJ(η) × RJ(η) → R ∪ {−∞} as
νiη(zη) =
 uiη
(
xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j)
)
if xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≥ 0;
−∞ otherwise.
,
where zη = (xη, θη, ϕη). It follows that, for any T ≥ 1,
∑
η∈DT ν
i
η(z
i,T
η ) ≤
∑
η∈D ν
i
η(z
i
η).
7
For each η ∈ D and γη ∈ R+, define Liη(·, γ; p, q) : Z(η)× Z(η−)→ R as
Liη(zη, zη− , γη; p, q) = νiη(zη)− γη giη(zη, zη− ; p, q).
Given T ∈ N, for each η ∈ DT−1, define the set ΞT (η) as the family of allocations (xη, θη, ϕη) ∈ Z(η)
that satisfies xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη. Also, for any η ∈ DT , let ΞT (η) be the set of
6In fact, define a new problem (P˜ i,T ),
(P˜ i,T )
max
∑
η∈DT
uiη
(
xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j)
)
s.t.

zη := (xη , θη , ϕη) ∈ Z(η) ∀ η ∈ DT ,
giη(zη , zη− ; p, q) ≤ 0, ∀ η ∈ DT ,
xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη , ∀ η ∈ DT ,
zη ∈ [0, ziη ], ∀ η ∈ DT ,
If q(η,j) = 0 then θ(η,j) = 0.
Under Assumption A2 the objective function on (P˜ i,T ) is continuous, and the set of admissible allocations is compact
in
∏
η∈DT Z(η). Note that, to ensure this it is necessary to have non-zero collateral requirements, otherwise, long
and short positions are unbounded.
Thus, there is a solution (zi,Tη )η∈DT . Moreover, this solution for (P˜
i,T ) is also an optimal choice for (P i,T ).
Essentially, the existence of a finite optimum at prices (p, q) for the agent i’s problem ensure that, when q(η,j) = 0,
the payments F(µ,j)(pµ) must be equal zero, for each µ ∈ η+. Thus, when q(η,j) = 0, choosing positives amounts of
θ(η,j) does not induce any gains.
7Note that, otherwise, agent i improve his utility in D choosing the allocation (zi,Tη )η∈DT in the sub-tree D
T ,
without making any (physical or financial) trade after the nodes with date T .
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allocations (xη, θη, ϕη) ∈ Z(η) that satisfies both xη+
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη and (xη, θη, ϕη) ∈
[0, ziη]. Let Ξ
T :=
∏
η∈DT Ξ
T (η).
It follows from Rockafellar (1997, Theorem 28.3), that there exist non-negative multipliers (γi,Tη )η∈DT
such that the following saddle point property holds,∑
η∈DT
Liη(zη, zη− , γi,Tη ; p, q) ≤
∑
η∈DT
Liη(zi,Tη , zi,Tη− , γi,Tη ; p, q), ∀(zη)η∈DT ∈ ΞT ,(10)
and γi,Tη g
i
η(z
i,T
η , z
i,T
η− ; p, q) = 0.
Claim A. For each µ ∈ D, the sequence (γi,Tµ )T≥t(µ) is bounded. Moreover, given T > t(µ),
νiµ(aµ)− νiµ(ziµ) ≤
γi,Tµ ∇1giµ(p, q) + ∑
η∈µ+
γi,Tη ∇2giη(p, q)
 · (aη − ziη) + ∑
ξ∈D\DT−1
νiξ(z
i
ξ), ∀ aµ ∈ ΞT (µ),
where, for any η ∈ D, the vector (∇1giη(p, q),∇2giη(p, q)) is defined by
∇1giη(p, q) =
(
pη, qη, (pηC(η,j) − q(η,j))j∈J(η)
)
,
∇2giη(p, q) =
(−pηYη, (F(η,j))j∈J(η), (pηYηC(η,j) − F(η,j))j∈J(η)) .
Proof. Given t ≤ T , substitute the following allocation in inequality (10)
zη =
 (W iη, 0, 0), ∀ η ∈ Dt−1,(0, 0, 0), ∀ η ∈ DT \Dt−1.
We have: ∑
η∈Dt
γi,Tη pηW
i
η ≤
∑
η∈DT
νiη(z
i,T
η ) ≤
∑
η∈D
νiη(z
i
η).(11)
Assumptions A1 ensure that, for each η ∈ D, minl∈LW i(η,l) > 0. Also, Assumption A2 implies that
‖pη‖Σ > 0, guaranteing that, for each µ ∈ D, the sequence (γi,Tµ )T>t(µ) is bounded.
On the other hand, given (zη)η∈DT ∈ ΞT , using (10), we have that∑
η∈DT
Liη(zη, zη− , γi,Tη ; p, q) ≤
∑
η∈D
νiη(z
i
η).
Thus, fix µ ∈ DT−1 and aµ ∈ ΞT (µ). If we evaluate inequality above in
zη =
 ziη, ∀ η 6= µ,aµ, for η = µ,
we obtain
νiµ(aµ)− γi,Tµ giµ(aµ, ziµ− ; p, q)−
∑
η∈µ+
γi,Tη g
i
η(z
i
η, aµ; p, q) ≤ νiµ(ziµ) +
∑
η∈D\DT
νiη(z
i
η).(12)
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Since functions (giξ(· ; p, q); ξ ∈ D) are affine, we have
giµ(aµ, z
i
µ− ; p, q) = ∇1giµ(p, q) · aµ − pµωiµ +∇2giµ(p, q) · ziµ−
giη(z
i
η, aµ; p, q) = ∇1giη(p, q) · ziη − pηωiη +∇2giη(p, q) · aµ, ∀η ∈ µ+.
Also, budget feasibility of (ziη)η∈D at prices (p, q), jointly with monotonicity of preferences, ensure
that,
−pµωiµ +∇2giµ(p, q) · ziµ− = −∇1giµ(p, q) · ziµ,
∇1giη(p, q) · ziη − pηωiη = −∇2giη(p, q) · ziµ, ∀ η ∈ µ+.
Therefore,
γi,Tµ g
i
µ(aµ, z
i
µ− ; p, q) +
∑
η∈µ+
γi,Tη g
i
η(z
i
η, aµ; p, q) =
γi,Tµ ∇1giµ(p, q) + ∑
η∈µ+
γi,Tη ∇2giη(p, q)
 · (aµ− ziµ).
Using (12), we conclude the proof. 
Since D is countable and, for any node η, the sequence (γi,Tη )T≥t(η) is bounded, using Ty-
chonoff Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 2.57)), there is a common subsequence
(Tk)k∈N ⊂ N and non-negative multipliers, (γiη)η∈D, such that, for each η ∈ D, limk→∞ γi,Tkη = γiη
and
γiη g
i
η(z
i
η, z
i
η− ; p, q) = 0,
where, as we said above, the last equation follows from the strictly monotonicity of uiη. Moreover,
taking the limit as T goes to infinity in inequality (13) we obtain that
∑
η∈Dt
γiηpηW
i
η ≤
∑
η∈D
νiη(z
i
η), ∀t ≥ 0.(13)
Therefore, equation (9) follows.
Since for any η ∈ D, Ξs1(η) = Ξs2(η) when min{s1, s2} > t(η), it follows from the inequality in
the statement of Claim above, taking the limit as T goes to infinity, that
νiη(aη)− νiη(ziη) ≤
γiη∇1giη(p, q) + ∑
µ∈η+
γiµ∇2giµ(p, q)
 · (aη − ziη), ∀ aη ∈ Ξt(η)+1(η).(14)
Thus, γiη∇1giη(p, q) + ∑
µ∈η+
γiµ∇2giµ(p, q)
 ∈ ∂ (νiη + δZ1(η) + δZ2(η)) (ziη),
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where the functions δZh(η) : RL × RJ(η) × RJ(η) → R ∪ {−∞}, h ∈ {1, 2}, satisfy
δZ1(η)(xη, θη, ϕη) =
 0, if (xη, θη, ϕη) ∈ Z(η),−∞, otherwise.
δZ2(η)(xη, θη, ϕη) =
 0, if xη +
∑
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη,
−∞, otherwise.
where zη = (xη, θη, ϕη) ∈ RL × RJ(η) × RJ(η). Since the plan (ziη)η∈D is physically feasible, there
exists a neighborhood V of ziη such that δZ2(η)(b) = 0 for every b ∈ V . Then, we have that
∂δZ2(η)(z
i
η) = {0}. Also, it follows by Theorem 23.8 and 23.9 in Rockafellar (1997), that there exists
viη ∈ ∂uiη(ciη) and κiη ∈ ∂δZ(η)(xiη, θiη, ϕiη) such that
(15) γiη∇1giη(p, q) +
∑
µ∈η+
γiµ∇2giµ(p, q) = (viη, 0, (C(η,j)viη)j∈J(η)) + κiη.
Notice that, by definition, for each zη ≥ 0, κ ∈ ∂δZ(η)(zη) ⇔ 0 ≤ κ(y − zη), ∀ y ≥ 0, therefore,
κiη ≥ 0. Thus, the inequalities stated in the lemma hold from equation (15). On the other hand,
strictly monotonicity of function uiη, ensure that v
i
η  0 and, therefore, it follows from (7), that γiη
is strictly positive. 
In a context of collateralized assets and linear utility penalties for default , Pa´scoa and Seghir
(2007) show that Ponzi schemes could be implemented if there exists a subtree D(ξ) such that, for
every node µ ≥ ξ, there is always some asset j ∈ J(µ) whose price exceeds the respective collateral
value, pµC(µ,j)−q(µ,j) < 0 (see Remark 3.1 in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2007)). In such event, the individ-
ual’s problem does not have a finite solution. In our context, the same result follows by analogous
arguments.
Lemma 2. Assume that, given x ∈ RL×D+ , if U i(x) is finite, then U i(y) > U i(x) for any y > x.
Also, suppose that additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently effective in a subtree D(ξ)
such that, for any η ∈ D(ξ), there exists j ∈ J(η) for which pηC(η,j) − q(η,j) < 0. Then, agent i’s
individual problem does not have a finite solution, otherwise, Ponzi schemes could be implemented.
Proof. Assume there is a budget feasible plan for agent i, (xi, θi, ϕi), that gives a finite optimum.
Under the monotonicity condition stated in the Lemma, pη  0 for every node η ∈ D(ξ). For each
η ∈ D(ξ), let J1(η) = {j ∈ J(η) : pηC(η,j)−q(η,j) < 0}. Now, consider the allocation (xξ, θξ, ϕξ)ξ∈D,
with
(
(xµ, θµ, ϕµ); (θη, ϕ(η,j))
)
µ/∈D(ξ), η∈D(ξ) =
(
(xiµ, θ
i
µ, ϕ
i
µ); (θ
i
η, ϕ
i
(η,j))
)
µ/∈D(ξ), η∈D(ξ)
, ∀j ∈ J(η)\J1(η)
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and
ϕ(η,j) = ϕi(η,j) + δη, ∀η ∈ D(ξ), ∀j ∈ J1(η),
x(η,l) = xi(η,l) +
1
(#L) p(η,l)
∑
j∈J1(η)
(
q(η,j) − pηC(η,j)
)
δη, ∀l ∈ L, if the node η = ξ,
x(η,l) = xi(η,l) +
1
(#L) p(η,l)
∑
j∈J1(η)
(
q(η,j) − pηC(η,j)
)
δη
− 1
(#L) p(η,l)
∑
j∈J1(η−)
pηA(η,j) δη− , ∀ η > ξ, ∀l ∈ L,
where the plan (δη)η∈D(ξ) is chosen in such form that the following conditions hold,∑
j∈J1(ξ)
(
q(ξ,j) − pξC(ξ,j)
)
δξ > 0,(16)
∑
j∈J1(η)
(
q(η,j) − pηC(η,j)
)
δη >
∑
j∈J1(η−)
pηA(η,j) δη− , ∀η > ξ.(17)
It follows that (xξ, θξ, ϕξ)ξ∈D is budget feasible at prices (p, q). Moreover, equations above show
that Ponzi schemes are possible at prices (p, q). In fact, agent i increases his borrowing at ξ and
pays his future commitments by using new credit. It follows that (xξ, θξ, ϕξ)ξ∈D improves the utility
level of agent i, contradicting the optimality of (xi, θi, ϕi). 
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